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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: JUDICIAL REVIEW-PRESERVER
OF THE PROCESS
MICHAEL

P. WAXMAN*

Introduction
Administrative law has experienced substantial change since the
passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).' Originally conceived as the governmental entities which were responsible for the de-

tail work (fact finding and enforcement) of implementing legislative
objectives with review by the judicial branch,2 administrative agencies
(quasi-independent parts of the executive branch) have lately become
the target of attack by the very branches of government that created
them.3 Indeed, while both the legislative and executive branches have
tried to override agency action or remove agency authority, 4 only the
federal courts have steadfastly maintained the review procedures originally established by the APA.
Two significant problems arise in the efforts of the legislative and
executive branches to provide extrajudicial review of administrative
agency action. First, unlike the traditional judicial review procedure of
precedential decisions by life-tenured judges, the policy decisions of
Congress and the President reflect the "political realities" of reelection.
Second, Congress sometimes issues vague directions to administra* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. B.S., 1969, Cornell University; J.D., 1973, Boston College Law School.
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-706 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
2.

See S. BREYER AND R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 37-

84 (1979).
3. See McGowan, Congress, Court and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
1119, 1135-39 (1977).
4. This has been true on both the executive and "independent" agency levels: E.g., EXEC.
ORDER No. 12,291, 46 FED. REG. 13,193 (1981); and, Federal Trade Commission Improvements
Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. § 58 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The validity of one-house vetoes has been
questioned. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd INS v. Chadha, 51 U.S.L.W. 4907
(June 23, 1983). Subsequent to writing this article the Supreme Court held the i-house legislative
veto unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers. See INS v. Chadha, 51 U.S.L.W.
4907 (June 23, 1983). The Supreme Court also invalidated the 2-house veto of an independent
regulatory agency's exercise of legislative rule-making power. See U.S. Senate v. FTC, 51
U.S.L.W. 3488 (July 6, 1983); U.S. House of Rep. v. FTC, 51 U.S.L.W. 3617 (July 6, 1983). But
see Nathanson, Separation of PowersandAdministrativeLaw.- Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and
the "Independent"Agencies,75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1064 (1981); and Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto Rules ofAdministrative Agencies Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79
(1982).
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tive agencies. Often these are reflective of the essential process of congressional compromise. Unfortunately, as the political pendulum
swings, the review of administrative agency action by Congress may be
considered unresponsive or too responsive to those directions. 5
In contrast to politically motivated review, the chief benefit of judicial review has been a continuity of legal precedent which is consonant with our common law heritage and the separation of power. 6 In
order to preserve a detached presence the judiciary is often required to
assess the power of the court to review an agency's actions. Traditionally, judicial review is precluded only where there is "clear and convincing evidence" of congressional intent to preclude review. 7 On the
other hand, following closely upon the exhaustion of administrative
remedies, 8 appellate courts will not ordinarily decide a question which
was not raised before an administrative agency or a district court. 9
During the 1981-82 judicial season the Seventh Circuit decided a
number of cases which required analysis of the breadth of judicial
power to review administrative agency methods of decision-making
and the preclusion of appellate courts from considering issues not
raised below. If exceptions to precedent are symbolic of the development of administrative law this was a pennant-winning year for the
Seventh Circuit. The following cases reveal the quest for continuity in
judicial precedential development.
PRECLUSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Although the clear language of Section 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act precludes judicial review of agency action "corn5. See Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of
Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977).
6. See R. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 2-6 (1979).
7. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-41 (1967).
8. This standard was succinctly set forth in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303
U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938). Recent Supreme Court decisions have chipped away at the standard (e.g.,
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)) or reinforced it (e.g., FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of
California, 449 U.S. 232 (1980)). The standard has survived but its application is sometimes
restricted. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE TREATISE § 20.11 (2d ed. 1978 & Supp. 1982) (herein-

after "K. DAVIS").
9. Traditionally appellate courts will not decide a question not raised before the administrative agency. Professor Davis has asserted that in the wake of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), appellate courts might radically alter this principle. K. DAVIS, supra n.8, §§ 20.11, 20.16.
Professor Davis argues that this is especially true for the Seventh Circuit. K. DAVIS, supra n.8,
§ 20.15 at 292. The Seventh Circuit declared in Myron v. Chicoine, 678 F.2d 727, 732 n.7 (7th Cir.
1982), that it does not view Mathews as an abolition of this well-established principle. The decision in Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cit. 1982), indicates that the Seventh Circuit
may be more willing to consider "unraised" issues in administrative law cases than it admits.
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mitted to agency discretion by law,"' 0 the United States Supreme Court
nonetheless has enunciated a strong presumption against precluding judicial review.I' Indeed the Court has declared that such preclusion will
convincing evidence" of congresoccur only where there is "clear and
2
sional intent to preclude review.'
The Supreme Court wrestled with this conflict in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Vope. 13 In that case the Court held the exception to judicial review is "very narrow" and applicable only in those
rare instances where "statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a
given case there is no law to apply. . . . 4
Professor Davis has been openly critical of the Overton Park "law
to apply" standard for reviewability. 15 He asserts that prior to Overton
Park a court had the power to review as declared in the "language of
the APA in [section] 706(1)(A) that '[t]he reviewing court shall. . . set
aside agency action. . . found to be. . . an abuse of discretion' ....
[Tihe law was clear that one role of reviewing courts was to protect
16
against 'abuse of discretion' whether or not 'law' existed to apply."'
Professor Davis concludes that the judicial review function has been
7
crippled by the "law to apply" test.'
Despite Professor Davis' views, the federal courts consistently
have attempted to apply the Overton Park rule. In Jaymar-Ruby,Inc. v.
FTC ,18 Jaymar, among other companies, had produced voluminous
material pursuant to an investigative subpoena issued by the FTC.
Upon Jaymar's entry into a cease and desist Consent Order, the FTC
ended its investigation. Subsequently, the FTC received requests from
various state attorneys general pursuant to section 6(f) of the FTC Act
seeking access to the FTC's Jaymar file to determine if Jaymar had
violated various state antitrust or deceptive trade practice laws. 19
The Commission determined that providing the files to the attorneys general would not jeopardize the material's commercial sensitiv10. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
11. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 500-01 (1977).
12. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-41 (1967).
13. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
14. Id at 410, quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 26 (1945). "In the whole, huge
body of law of judicial review of administrative action, only one infection seriously festers and
grows worse--the law that reviewability depends on presence or absence of 'law to apply.'" K.
DAVIS, supra n.8, § 28.16 at 499.
15. Id
16. Id
17. Id
18. 651 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1981).
19. Id at 509.
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ity. 20 Jaymar instituted suit seeking a declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief to prevent the FTC from permitting the attorneys general access to the files. 2 1 The district court held the Commission's decision to release the materials was within the agency's unreviewable
22
discretion under section 701(a)(2) of the APA.
The Seventh Circuit considered whether the FTC's decision to disclose its investigative files to state attorneys general pursuant to the
Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 198023 was judicially
reviewable. The FTC's actions were based on an amendment to section 46(f) of the Federal Trade Commission Act 24 which specifically

authorized the FTC to share any "privileged" information with any
state law enforcement agency that requested information. 25 The only
restrictions on the sharing of the information was that the agency certify (1) that the information will remain confidential and (2) that the
26
information will be used only for official law enforcement purposes.
The Seventh Circuit held that judicial review of FTC actions pursuant to section 46(f) was precluded under the Overton Park "exception. ' '27 The court stated that because Congress did not specify any

statutory criteria to be considered by the FTC in reaching its decisions
under section 46(f), Congress did not intend judicial review of FTC
decisions to disclose. 28 This interpretation was supported by a comparison of the various sections of the FTC Improvements Act of 1980
which specifically provided for judicial review, unlike section 46(f)
which made no mention of judicial review. 29 The Seventh Circuit
claimed that the failure to refer to judicial review in 46(f) raised a pre30
sumption that Congress did not intend judicial review.
The Jaymar-Ruby opinion ignores Professor Davis' concerns
about Overton Park. In addition, the court's decision raises two new
concerns. First, despite citation to Southern Railway Co. v. Seaboard
Allied Milling Corp. ,31 the Seventh Circuit apparently ignored the
Supreme Court's language in Southern Railway which expanded on the
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id
Id at 509-10.
Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. v. FTC, 496 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
15 U.S.C. § 58 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
Jaymar-Ruby, 651 F.2d at 510-11.
id See 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
Jaymar-Ruby, 651 F.2d at 510-11.
Id at 511-12.
Id at 510.
Id
442 U.S. 444, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 890 (1979).
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Overton Park test. In Southern Railway, the Court stated that the question is not whether the agency has "law to apply" in its determination
but whether the reviewing court has "law to apply."'32 Citing Overton
Park, the Supreme Court in Southern Railway said, "[O]n the face of
the statute there is simply no 'law to apply' in determining if the
33
[agency's] decision is correct."
The second issue is the Seventh Circuit's reference to congressional failure to act as inferring intent not to act. 34 Unlike the opinions
in Southern Railway and Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 35 the Jaymar-Ruby court indicated that intent by inference alone can be a sufficient basis to decide
that agency discretion was unreviewable as a matter of law. 36 This
interpretation would lessen greatly the Abbott Laboratories "clear and
convincing evidence" test. 37 Although the Jaymar-Ruby decision is
probably the right result, the mechanisms used by the court to get there
leave significant unresolved issues.
JUDICIAL REVIEW-POWERS OF THE COURT

In Wright v. Califano3 8 the Seventh Circuit held that the district
court abused its discretion by ordering that all applications for participation in federal social security programs not timely processed by the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) would be automatically approved. 39 Although the Seventh Circuit was clearly concerned about the large number of social security applicants who were
entitled to benefits but whose applications were caught up in the mammoth backlog of cases at HHS, the court reasoned that sometimes the
burden on the administrative agency outweighed the due process right
of potential welfare recipients. 4°
32. Id at 455-56.
33. Id
34. Jaymar-Ruby, 651 F.2d at 510.
35. 605 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980). Both Southern Railway
and Board of Trade held agency decision-making immune from judicial review. The court's decisions were each based on three factors: In Southern Railway the factors were the actual language
of the Act, its relationship to other statutory provisions and its legislative history. In Board of
Trade the factors were the actual language of the Act, its relationship to other statutory provisions
and the nature of the agency's authority.
36. Jaymar-Ruby, 651 F.2d at 510.
37. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967). See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
38. 587 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1978).
39. Id at 356-57.
40. Id at 354-56.
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However, in Smith v. Miller4 ' the Seventh Circuit indicated there
was a limit to its tolerance of administrative backlog in public welfare
cases. In Smith, the Illinois Department of Public Aid maintained a
system which would only reimburse providers of special medical care
to welfare recipients if the recipients had received the Department's
"prior approval" for such care. 42 If the care was provided before approval, the provider would not be paid even if it later qualified for
reimbursement.4 3 Smith was a representative of a class whose past or
pending requests for special medical or dental care were not processed
promptly enough to satisfy the requirements of Title XIX of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) (now Health and
Human Services) regulations interpreting the Social Security Act. 44
Conceding that the district court had authority to fashion an equitable remedy, the Department on appeal questioned the district court's
exercising its equitable powers in anticipation of the Department's fail45
ure to observe the court's order.
The Seventh Circuit quickly disposed of the questions concerning
the right of the district court to order a remedy that anticipates an administrative agency's failure to comply. The court noted, "Many courts
have exercised equitable powers to force a state to make or continue
making public relief payments until the state's administration of its
public aid program comports with federal statutory or constitutional
standards." 46
Wright v. Califano confirmed the state's broad discretion to set
standards of need and determine the initial eligibility criteria for its
public assistance program. 4 7 The Seventh Circuit distinguished Smith
from Wright on the basis of the potential recipient's place in the welfare system. Unlike in Wright, the Smith recipients had already been
subject to and met the medicaid eligibility criteria. 48 The distinction
between those applicants who are making an initial application for wel41. 665 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1981).
42. Id at 173-74.
43. Id at 174.
44. Id, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(8) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
45. Smith, 665 F.2d at 175.
46. Id at 175. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Eder v. Beal, 609 F.2d 695
(3d Cir. 1979).
47. Wright, 587 F.2d at 350-54. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408 (1970).
48. Smith, 665 F.2d at 176. Two other factors may have affected the Smith decision. First, as
noted earlier, services provided before approval would never be compensated despite subsequent
qualification for treatment. See text accompanying notes 42 and 43, supra. Second, since the
issuance of the district court's order 93% of all applications for specialized medical care requiring
prior approval under the Department's regulations were eventually approved. 665 F.2d at 176.
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fare benefits and those already qualified has been commonly accepted
in "due process" cases. 49 The Seventh Circuit in Smith found it is
within a district court's discretion to presume that a state will not comply with its order and contemplate relief for noncompliance. 50
Once the court determined that the medicaid recipients in the
Smith case had greater rights than those in the Wright case, it then
reweighed the balance of harm to the individual recipients as opposed
to the burden on the state agency. On one side was the financial
and/or medical care loss to individuals denied certain medicaid coverage because the state had taken too long to process claims. On the
other side was the financial loss to the state from being forced to grant
coverage to everyone who had passed initial screening regardless of
whether some claims later turned out to be fraudulent. The Seventh
Circuit concluded that the backlog harmed the potential medical recipient far more than the agency. 5' The court held that where the scales tip
to the potential recipient the district court may order "automatic
52
approval."
SUBPOENA ENFORCEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Courts have usually been willing to compel compliance with subpoenas issued by administrative agency officials because they have understood the necessity for a full explication of the facts before the
agency can make a reasoned decision. Courts have applied to their
review of administrative agency subpoenas the same sort of criteria
they apply to subpoena requests of parties in a judicial setting. Essentially, the courts have looked to the relevance of the subpoenaed material to the hearing5 3 and the burden on the subpoenaed party in
supplying the material. 54 In addition, third parties to administrative
hearings may also raise their nonparticipant status as a factor in weigh55
ing the burdensomeness of a subpoena issued against them.
Burdensomeness is usually measured by a balancing of the need
for and probative value of the subpoenaed material by the requesting
49.
Wright
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970);
v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1978).
Smith, 665 F.2d at 180.
Id at 176.
Id at 178.
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
See, e.g., FTC v. Shafrner, 626 F.2d 32, 38 (7th Cir. 1980).
FTC v. Bowman, 149 F. Supp. 624, 629-30 (N.D. Il.1975), aff'd, 248 F.2d 456 (7th Cir.
1957). See also W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAuss, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, at 569 (7th ed.
1979).
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party, against the various burdens that will be incurred by the subpoenaed third party in providing the documents 6 The subpoenaing
party's need for the information is often measured by the benefit ex57
pected to be derived from the subpoenaed documents.
The burden on the subpoenaed party traditionally includes:
(1) the material to be submitted is confidential 58 and (2) the amount of
time, effort and inconvenience to obtain the material59-although the
latter is rarely sufficient by itself.60 The confidentiality problem can
often be resolved by a "protective order."'6' Although there have been
circumstances where a protective order has been insufficient to satisfy
the burden of confidentiality, it usually eliminates or lessens the burden
sufficiently to permit enforcement. 62 Where the burden of compliance
63
is too great, a subpoena request may be denied or reduced in scope.
Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen 64 has added academic freedom as a
new factor that may be considered in weighing the burden on a subpoenaed party. In Dow, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued an emergency order to suspend certain uses of two herbicides
manufactured by Dow. In the subsequent hearing, Dow requested that
the Administrative Law Judge (A.L.J.) issue subpoenas compelling certain University of Wisconsin researchers to disclose virtually all information they possessed relative to an on-going study which formed a
part of the basis for the EPA's decision to issue the emergency suspension order. The University of Wisconsin (UW) study related to the
effects of the use of some of the herbicides produced by Dow. Although the agency no longer based its argument for suspension upon
the study, the A.L.J. issued the subpoenas. However, the district court
65
refused to enforce them.
56. See In re Zuchert, 28 F.R.D. 29 (D.D.C. 1961), aff'd inpartsub. nom., Machin v. Zuckert,
316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 296 (1963); FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
57. See W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, at 568 (7th ed. 1979).
58. See FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899, 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
59. Id at 908.
60. See United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973); FTC v. Standard American,
Inc., 306 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1962); and Adams v. FTC, 296 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 864 (1962).
61. "When the burden asserted in defense to a subpoena is ... [the] commercial risks involved in providing [the subpoenaed documents or information] the judicial response is . .. to
consider issuance of a protective order." See W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, at 567 (7th ed. 1979).
62. See FTC v. Lonning, 539 F.2d 202, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
64. 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982).
65. Id at 1266. The history of the parties in this case is intricate. The United States was the

original petitioner for enforcement in the district court but withdrew from the appeal of the dis-
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On appeal, the Seventh Circuit independently assessed the burden
of compliance on the UW research team. It held that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in finding "that the risk of even inadvertent
premature disclosure so far outweighed the probative value of and
need for the information as to itself constitute an unreasonable burden
on respondents." 66 Despite the fact that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 67 specifically recognized the need to subpoena documents from non-parties, 68 the Seventh Circuit nonetheless
supported the district court's consideration of third party status as a
factor in weighing whether there was an undue burden on the subpoe69
naed party.
Finally, despite the fact that neither the parties nor the district
court had raised the issue, the Seventh Circuit decided to address the
question of the subpoena's burden on academic freedom 70 which was
71
raised in an amicus curiae brief filed by the State of Wisconsin.
The Seventh Circuit, citing University of California Regents v.
Bakke,72 asserted that academic freedom is a special concern of the
first amendment. 7 3 A "First Amendment scholar" rather than any judicial precedent was cited to tie university laboratory scholarly research
to the first amendment special concern for academic freedom. 74 Having tied scholarly research to academic freedom, the court noted that
like other constitutional rights academic freedom must be balanced
against important competing interests. 75 However, the only case cited
for this principle is totally unrelated to the issues in Dow.76
trict court's order denying enforcement. Dow, the intervening petitioner in the district court, perfected the appeal. A group of Vietnam veterans and families of servicemen were permitted as
intervenors because of the relevance of the studies to suits arising out of servicemen's exposure to
the defoliants used in Southeast Asia between 1962 and 1971. The State of Wisconsin appeared as
amicus curiae. Id at 1266 n.2.
66. Id at 1274.
67. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
68. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(d) permits an Administrative Law Judge to issue a subpoena to "any
person."
69. Dow, 672 F.2d at 1277.
70. Id at 1274-77. As noted in Judge Pell's concurring opinion, the court had sufficient
grounds to uphold the district court without addressing the burden on academic freedom. Judge
Pell refused to join in the academic freedom part of the opinion. Id at 1278-80.
71. Id at 1274. Oddly, in Myron v. Chicoine, 678 F.2d 727, 732 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982), the
Seventh Circuit emphasized, in dicta, that it is generally unwilling to take a new issue on appeal,
much less establish it as a new factor in future decision-making.
72. 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
73. Dow, 672 F.2d at 1274.
74. Dow, 672 F.2d at 1275 citing, T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
594 (1970).
75. Id
76. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, reh'g denied, 361 U.S. 854 (1959), involved a
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Despite the "surprisingly sparse" case law "considering the standard to be applied where the issue is academic freedom of the university [or its researchers] to be free of governmental interference, '7 7 the
court stretched to find Supreme Court precedent (once again cases
without fact situations similar to Dow) 78 that "suggests that to prevail
over academic freedom the interests of government must be strong and
'79
the extent of intrusion carefully limited.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that scholarly research under its
academic freedom umbrella "may properly figure into the legal calculation of whether forced disclosure would be reasonable. ' 80 It then
proceeded to support the district court's denial of the subpoena based
8
on this new standard. 1

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE:

USE OF MECHANICAL DEVICES IN

ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKING

Can an Administrative Law Judge, after taking and determining
evidence, be required by the administrative agency to substitute a
mechanical "grid" for his usual discretion in deciding whether the evidence qualifies a party for coverage under a disability program? If so,
should relevant evidence which is not contemplated in the "grid" be
considered in the decision-making process? These novel issues were
the subject of two Seventh Circuit decisions with resolution of the latter
surprisingly preceding the former.
In 1978 the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Health
and Human Services) initiated a procedure to expedite and improve
the uniformity of social security disability cases. The procedure, to be
applied after an A.L.J. takes evidence and makes evidentiary findings,
required that the A.L.J. apply his or her evidentiary findings to the

Social Security Administration's medical vocational guidelines ("grid")
and thereby determine whether there are jobs available in the United
criminal contempt conviction of a teaching fellow who refused to answer questions concerning his
membership in the Communist Party.
77. Dow, 672 F.2d at 1275.
78. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 581-82
(1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
79. Dow, 672 F.2d at 1275. The court also noted in a related discussion that a protective
order "would not have eliminated the chilling effect which invariably accompanies governmentally authorized intrusions into the intellectual life of the university." Id at 1278.
80. Dow, 672 F.2d at 1276-77. The court's sole support for this conclusion, Richards of
Rockford v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976), is the only known case in
the area.
81. Dow, 672 F.2d at 1277.
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States for the disability claimant.8 2
The use of the "grid," as described above, has been the subject of
considerable judicial debate. In Santise v. Harris,8 3 a district court concluded that "H.E.W.'s reliance on a grid, drawn in advance to cover a
wide variety of individual cases, does not satisfy its obligation of basing
its conclusion on substantial evidence. '8 4 The Santise court explained
that the grid was especially harmful because the A.L.J. is required by
regulation to decide in accordance with the chart, and thus it fails to
fulfill the A.L.J.'s, and thus the agency's, obligation to decide each
85
claim on a case by case basis.
Where the application of the grid results in a determination of disability the courts have consistently upheld the grid and over-ruled an
A.L.J. decision of no disability. 6 But, where the use of the grid produces a finding of no disability the courts have not been as quick to
87
overrule an A.L.J.'s separate determination.
8
the appellant challenged the failure of the
In Cannon v. Harris,"
A.L.J. and the grid to consider non-exertional limitations (e.g., alcoholism) on her ability to work. Cannon had suffered significant infirmities
which led to major surgery. Subsequent to the surgery she applied for
disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income. Both
were denied initially. Upon reconsideration, the A.L.J., after reviewing
medical and vocational reports (but failing to assess an allegation of
alcoholism in the reports) found, applying the grid, that Cannon retained the residual functional capacity for light work.8 9 After the
A.L.J.'s decision was approved by final agency action, and upheld by
the district court, Cannon appealed to the Seventh Circuit. 90
The Seventh Circuit reversed the case concluding that:
Where non-exertional limitations have been shown, either alone or
82. 43 Fed. Reg. 55349 (1978). Although the regulations have been revised [see 45 Fed. Reg.
55566 (1980)] the analysis used in Cannon v. Harris, 657 F.2d 513 (7th Cjr. 1981), is unchanged in
its application. For examination of the Cannon analysis see text accompanying notes 89-94, rupra.
83. 501 F. Supp. 274 (D.N.J. 1980), rev. sub nom., Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925 (3d Cir.
1982) (upholding the use of the grid).
84. Santise, 501 F. Supp. at 276.
85. Id at 275-77.
86. See, e.g., Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1980); Hicks v. Califano, 600 F.2d 1048
(4th Cir. 1979).
87. Compare Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 667 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1981),
and Stallings v. Harris, 493 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Tenn. 1980) (upholding use of grid to find no
disability) with Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731 (11 th Cir. 1981), and Vasquez v. Schweiker,
534 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (reversing use of grid to find no disability).
88. 651 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1981).
89. Id at 516.
90. Id
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in combination with exertional limitations, the guidelines cannot be

used to direct a finding of not disabled. In such cases a finding of not
disabled can be made only after further consideration of the claimant's non-exertional impairments in light of his unique vocational
characteristics. 9 1
The court found the A.L.J.'s failure to consider a factor not included in the grid a sufficient basis for overruling his decision. 92 The
court reasoned that because social security disability hearings are
nonadversarial the A.L.J. is obliged to discover and assess additional
undisclosed information relevant to non-exertional vocational
93
impairments.
Cannon left two very large questions open: (1) Is the binding grid
system itself acceptable; and (2) If so, what is the value of the grid if a
"non-exertional impairment" is alleged?
Less than a year after Cannon the Seventh Circuit decided Cummins v. Schweiker. 94 First, Cummins directly attacked the A.L.J.'s
mandatory use of the grid to deny benefits as unsupported by substantial evidence. Second, Cummins asserted that because a non-exertional
impairment was involved the A.L.J. was precluded from applying the
grid.
Cummins was a middle-aged manual laborer who was blind in
one eye, had some arthritis and, due to a recent automobile accident,
had a permanent but mild weakness on the right side of his body. By
applying the grid, the A.L.J. held that Cummins was incapable of performing the heavy work he had done before but he was capable of
sedentary work and, therefore, not "disabled" within the meaning of
the regulation. 95
The Seventh Circuit concluded that, despite the binding nature of
the criteria, the grid applied a broader (and presumably more valid)
knowledge of the labor market than the ad hoc judgments of an A.L.J.
who would base his decision on the testimony of vocational experts and
other witnesses presented at trial. 96 Mandatory use of the grid was held
not only lawful under HHS's grant of authority but a highly appropri91. Id at 517 (citation omitted).
92. Id at 518-20.
93. Id at 519. The court emphasized that this was even truer in Cannon's case because she
was not represented by counsel. Id
94. 670 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1982).
95. Id at 82-83.
96. Id This conforms with research on Social Security hearings. In disability cases".
hearings are quite informal. Witnesses, other than vocational or medical experts, seldom testify,
and the expert witness is seldom subjected to searching or lengthy cross-examination." J.
MASHAW, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CARROW, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS 64 (1978).
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ate vehicle to streamline the adjudication of social security disability
97
cases and bring about greater uniformity in their results.
Cummins also asserted, like Cannon, that his non-exertional impairment required the A.L.J. to go beyond the grid. 98 But here, unlike
in Cannon, the A.L.J. considered factors (non-exertional limitations)
outside the grid in making the required findings of fact. The A.L.J.,
supported by substantial evidence, found that the non-exertional impairment would not alter the application of the grid. 99 The Seventh
Circuit has clearly concluded in possible non-exertional impairment
situations that the grid should be applied with consideration of the possible non-exertional impairment but a change should occur from the
grid decision only if the non-exertional factor warrants a change.' °°
Professor Davis has indicated he felt the weaknesses of the current
administrative law system lie in its isolation of the A.L.J. from a significant amount of specialized information more readily accessible to the
agency as a whole.' 0' Now, in the Seventh Circuit, the mandatory use
of the grid upheld in Cannon and Cummins permits an A.L.J. to use the
full resources of the agency in his or her independent decision-making.
PHYSICIAN'S TESTIMONY IN SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS

Cummins also put a ceiling on the value of the testimony of treating physicians in social security hearings. In Allen v. Weinberger 0 2 the
Seventh Circuit held that once it is determined that an impairment exists, the opinions of the treating physician should be given substantially
greater weight than the impressions of a doctor who sees the claimant
only once. 0 3 In Cummins the court noted that the mere fact that the
claimant's physician happened to be a treating physician did not, per
se, entitle his evidence to have controlling weight. 0 4
AGENCY LEGISLATIVE V. INTERPRETATIVE RULEMAKING

A legislative rule is the product of an exercise of delegated legislative power to make laws through rules. An interpretative rule is any
97. Cummins, 670 F.2d at 83.
98. Id at 83-84.
99. Id at 84.
100. Id But see Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 736 (11th Cir. 1981) and Vasquez v.
Schweiker, 534 F. Supp. 670, 671 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (a nonexertional impairment may automatically eliminate the use of the grid).
101. See 3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 17.8-17.10 (2d ed. 1980).
102. 552 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1977).
103. Id at 786-87.
104. Cummins, 670 F.2d at 84.
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rule an agency issues without exercising delegated legislative power to
make law through rules. The importance of the distinctions is whether
05
it is necessary to give notice and hold hearings on the proposed rule.
Sometimes it is difficult to determine whether a rule or an amendment to a rule is legislative or interpretative. The agency's classification of its rules is not automatically accepted by the courts. 1°6 Instead,
the courts usually look to the "effect" of the agency rule rather than the
label the agency has put on its action.' 0 7 This problem may be compounded if the agency action follows an adverse judicial decision on
the rule.'0 8
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. ,109 the Supreme Court invalidated
warrantless inspections pursuant to an OSHA regulation which permitted OSHA officials to "promptly take appropriate action, including
compulsory process, if necessary," upon an employer's refusal to permit entry by an OSHA inspector."10 In a footnote, the Supreme Court
stated that "a regulation expressly providing that the Secretary could
proceed ex parte to seek a warrant or its equivalent would appear to be
as much within the Secretary's power as the regulation currently in
force and calling for 'compulsory process.' """ In response to the
Supreme Court's note, the Secretary of Labor amended the regulation
by defining "compulsory process" to mean, "[T]he institution of any
appropriate action, including ex parte application for an inspection
2
warrant or its equivalent.""
Subsequent to the Department's amendment of the regulation, an
OSHA inspector visited Rockford Drop Forge. After the inspector was
denied entry OSHA obtained an ex parte warrant pursuant to the
amended regulation.' 3 The company challenged the inspector's warrant, in Rockford Drop Forge, Co. v. Donovan,"14 claiming that OSHA
could not utilize the exparte procedure because the Secretary failed to
follow the notice and hearing procedures required for legislative rule105. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.8 (2d ed. 1979) at 36.
106. Id See, e.g., Marshall v. Huffines Steel Co., 488 F. Supp. 995, 999 (N.D. Tex. 1979), af#'d
sub nom., Donovan v. Huffines Steel Co., 645 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1981); Cerro Metal Products v.
Marshall, 620 F.2d 964, 975-82 (3d Cir. 1980). But see Marshall v. W & W Steel Co., 604 F.2d
1322 (10th Cir. 1979).
107. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 7.17-7.19 (2d ed. 1979).
108. See Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
109. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
110. Id at 327.
111. Id at 320, n.15.
112. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4(d) (1978).

113. Rockford Drop Forge Co. v. Donovan, 672 F.2d 626, 627-28 (7th Cir. 1982).
114. Id
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making." 5' In response, the government argued that the amendment
16
only made explicit what the agency already had the power to do."
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Department's action "was
only an interpretation of the prior version and therefore exempt from
rule-making procedures by Section 4(b)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act. . . .,117 Relying on the footnote in Barlow's, the Seventh
Circuit found that the Supreme Court had approved the amended procedure in advance of the Secretary's action." 18 The only other rationale
for this holding was the cryptic assertion that the majority of federal
appeals courts had adequately explained the issue and the Seventh Circuit chose not to repeat their arguments." 19
Curiously enough the opinions cited by the Seventh Circuit are far
from uniform in their analysis and there are only two published decisions, an unpublished one, a concurring opinion and a dissent. 20 In
fact, the cases are consistent in result only--ie., the challenged regulation in each case was held not to violate the APA. Yet, despite the
court's citation of two cases12 ' which found a violation of Section 4(b),
it failed to respond to the findings of the Secretary's action as a legislative act. Most importantly, the Seventh Circuit did not consider
whether the new regulation had a "substantial impact." Even if the
regulation was classified as "interpretative" the Department nonetheless was required to determine whether the regulation had a substantial
22
impact warranting notice and comment procedures.1
Finally, the Seventh Circuit's reading of the footnote in Barlow's is
not the only logical interpretation of the Supreme Court's determination. One could just as easily analyze the Supreme Court's decision as
a rejection of the previous OSHA regulation. 23 Consequently, any future regulation would have to undergo the same scrutiny as other regu115. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
116. Rockford, 672 F.2d at 630.
117. Id
118. Id, ciling Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 n.15 (1978).
119. Rockford, 672 F.2d at 630.
120. Stoddard Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 627 F.2d 984, 989-90 (9th Cir. 1980); Marshall v.
Seaward Int'l, Inc., 644 F.2d 880 (4th Cir. 1981) (unpublished); Donovan v. Huffines Steel Co.,
645 F.2d 288, 289-91 (5th Cir. 1981) (Rubin, J.,
concurring); Cerro Metal Products v. Marshall,
620 F.2d 964, 983-85 (3d Cir. 1980) (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
121. Donovan v. Huffines Steel Co., 645 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1981); Cerro Metal Prod. v. Marshall, 620 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
122. See National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90, 95-97
(D.D.C. 1967), aff'dper curiam, 393 U.S. 18 (1968). See also 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 7.17-7.19 (2d ed. 1979). But see General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976),
reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1079 (1977).
123. It "would appear to be as much within the Secretary's power as the regulation currently
in force.
...Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 n.15 (1978).
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lations. In other words the Supreme Court did not decide in advance
of seeing them that the new "ex parte" regulations were lawfully
promulgated. This question was properly left to the court responsible
for review of the new regulations. Surprisingly, the Seventh Circuit
preferred not to do its own analysis of the new regulations but to take a
short cut by finding the issue already decided by the Supreme Court
and the other federal courts.
CONCLUSION

Congress enacts laws and expects administrative agencies to perform under the direction of those laws. Unfortunately, due to the necessary compromises of the political system congressional direction is
often muddled or vague. As the political winds shift administrative
agencies are sometimes admonished for following the direction too
closely or not closely enough. Congress could change the administrative direction by altering the substantive law. Instead, Congress has
acted to create an extra-judicial review mechanism outside the APA
process.
During the 1981-82 season, the Seventh Circuit has correctly
served the judicial role in the administrative process. Its decisions assessed the congressional direction and filled in gaps awaiting Congress'
changes in the substantive law. The courts, as the proper repository of
the review function, thus continue the process until Congress acts to
change the direction.

